Monday, December 11, 2017

Plant Minds: A Philosophical Defense (NDPR review)


Plant Minds: A Philosophical Defense
// Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

2017.12.09 : View this Review Online | View Recent NDPR Reviews

Chauncey Maher, Plant Minds: A Philosophical Defense, Routledge, 2017, 131 pp., $70.00 (hbk), ISBN 9781138739192.

Reviewed by Colin Allen, University of Pittsburgh

What do you know about plants? You might not be surprised to hear that plants account for much more of the planet's biomass than animals -- hundreds of times more, in some estimates. You may, however, be surprised to learn that the number of plant species is relatively small compared to the number of animal species. It is an interesting question why plants have not diversified as much as animals have, but perhaps their immobility accounts for it. Nevertheless, with somewhere in the range of 300,000 to 400,000 species (estimates vary widely), there is plenty enough diversity among plants to yield some very interesting adaptations, from communication to carnivory.

The details of such adaptations are...

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Sunday, December 10, 2017

The Legacy of Kant in Sellars and Meillassoux: Analytic and Continental Kantianism


For those interested, the book The Legacy of Kant in Sellars and Meillassoux: Analytic and Continental Kantianism, while perhaps being abit limited to specialists in some fairly narrow fields within philosophy, nevertheless does seem to have quite a few interesting avenues of query available for those with a broader interest in the history of philosophy.

I do not own this book but say as much from previewing what I could from it and by inferring that the book is the result of THIS conference (do check out their website). I'll copy below the table of contents and insert a link to the publishers website. But this would certainly be a book I'd love to review, if not to see what contemporary philosophy is doing with Kant and Sellars, and road of development which has as far as I can tell produced some very interesting in-roads and results.

Chapters include:

"After Kant, Sellars, and Meillassoux: Back to Empirical Realism?" by James R. O’Shea
"Sellars and Meillassoux: a Most Unlikely Encounter" by Aude Bandini
"Correlation, Speculation, and the Modal Kant-Sellars Thesis" by Ray Brassier
"Speculative Materialism or Pragmatic Naturalism?: Sellars contra Meillassoux" by Carl B. Sachs
"How to Know that we Know? The contemporary Post-Kantian problem of a priori synthetic judgments" by Anna Longo
"Toward the Thing-in Itself: Sellars’ and Meillassoux’s Divergent Conception of Kantian Transcendentalism" by Dionysis Christias
"A Plea for Narcissus. On the Transcendental Reflexion /\ Refraction Mediation Tandem" by Gabriel Catren
"Speculating the Real: On Quentin Meillassoux’s Philosophical Realism" by Joseph Cohen
"‘It is not until we have eaten the apple’: Forestalling the Necessity of Contingency" by Muhannad Hariri
"Puncturing the Circle of Correlation: Rationalism, Materialism, and Dialectics" by Daniel Sacilotto

Link to publisher's site HERE. Description below:
Contemporary interest in realism and naturalism, emerging under the banner of speculative or new realism, has prompted continentally-trained philosophers to consider a number of texts from the canon of analytic philosophy. The philosophy of Wilfrid Sellars, in particular, has proven remarkably able to offer a contemporary re-formulation of traditional "continental" concerns that is amenable to realist and rationalist considerations, and serves as an accessible entry point into the Anglo-American tradition for continental philosophers. With the aim of appraising this fertile theoretical convergence, this volume brings together experts of both analytic and continental philosophy to discuss the legacy of Kantianism in contemporary philosophy. The individual essays explore the ways in which Sellars can be put into dialogue with the widely influential work of Quentin Meillassoux, explaining how—even though their methods, language, and proximal influences are widely different—their philosophical stances can be compared thanks to their shared Kantian heritage and interest in the problem of realism. This book will be appeal to students and scholars who are interested in Sellars, Meillassoux, contemporary realist movements in continental philosophy, and the analytic-continental debate in contemporary philosophy.

Saturday, December 9, 2017

Involvement of the brain in the experience of chronic pain

At several points the article comes close to "blaming" the patient insofar as there now has been shown to be a direct contribution by the brain (rather than a mere reaction by the body) in the experience of pain. This is nothing new though, but I fear the fact that cognitive behavioral therapy has been shown to "affect" changes in the brain (although studies have not conclusively shown this nor have studies shown that the affect is experienced as a reduction in the perception of pain) may be used as further excuse to place pain almost exclusively in the category of "mere perception." Naturally, then, the experience of pain is said to be the patient's fault because only the patient would be unwilling (or unable) to change that perception of pain.  Terms such as "guarding," "pain catastrophizing," and "fear avoidant behavior" make their appearances in tandem with stating explicitly that "over sensitization" in the perception of pain is physiologically explained by genetics, and implicitly stating that cognitive behavioral therapy alone is an appropriate form of treatment in cases of severe chronic pain (because afterall, pain is "all in the head anyway"). Making matters worse, this new line of thinking follows upon the United State's current hysterics over opioids and considering what positive role opioids might play when appropriately included in a regimen that would actually treat pain, rather than just explain its perception - for the research cited suggests that simply stating pain is mostly a subjective perception is enough to serve as some form of treatment of it (i.e. explanation of pain somehow equals treatment). This puts pain patients at even more of a disadvantage in getting the help they need, moreso than ever before.

Link HERE.

Friday, December 8, 2017

What professional responsibility comes with being an editor-in-chief?

Bill Benzon at New Savannah posted some time back a blog post, "Is formal peer-review really useful anymore?", HERE. The post highlights formal peer-review versus "review by peers" (a much less formal if not completely informal and speedy form of review), and the question as to what purpose review by peers might serve as a "weeding out" mechanism of sorts.

Citing Timothy Gowers of TLS, the post mentions how review by peers before formal peer-review can establish "reliability" in addition to "weeding out the chaff" and "providing feedback to authors." These in the name of determining what scholarship is more valuable than other scholarship and justifying "quick judgments" regarding authors' ideas in certain journals versus others. I should note Benzon's own position here is rather neutral and so I am addressing Gowers moreso than I am Benzon, despite Benzon's post where I initially encountered this thought.

My own perspective is that when it comes to open access journals especially, in the name of the democratization of knowledge formal peer-review instead of review by peers would be the preferred route of review. That is, much like Rawls' veil of ignorance in his theory of justice, blind peer-review (the formal component of it) pretty much eliminates the worst of what inevitably occurs with the worst of review by peers. While there is still the chance of nepotism and the channeling of a journal or book series into ideological organ based upon content, at least authorship is depersonalized and the quality of content, i.e. scholarship, becomes focus. I say this because from my experience political agendas and gate-keeping has come into play on more than one occasion. But I'll come back to that in a moment.

As THIS article points out, titled rather succinctly "Many academics are eager to publish in worthless journals," many open access journals out of desperation abandon formal peer-review in favor of review by peers not to ensure expediency in decision-making, not to better categorize papers as either fitting the journal's theme versus not, nor even to "weed out the chaff" and separate quality scholarship from the rest; but rather to continue an ideological agenda, push or return favors, or simply maintain someone's "spot" (and the corresponding pecking order of their acolytes). This all in the name of weeding out the chaff, which results to not much more than empty gesturing. All too often those whom the editors simply dislike or have decided to blackball from their small neck of the woods (usually some highly specific corner of field x in the philosophy of y) are cut out despite the quality of their scholarship. Had formal review been in place the editors would have been forced to confront their own prejudice and that prejudice at least become visible to others involved in the process, but that hardly ever occurs. It is no surprise that given the review by peers landscape is advantageous to those who happen to have grabbed the vetting power, it is often the preferred form of review in cases where charlatanism and cronyism are rampant anyhow. In short, review by peers over any formal sort of review is a sure-fire way to establish and then secure someone's level of importance or influence beyond what it would be in reality had some other process been going on, or in some cases it even allows philosophers to continue on in a game of charlatanism and dupe others into believing that x "make believe" philosophy exists when in fact it doesn't (again, speculative realism is an excellent case in point).

Returning to speculative realism for a moment, as my post concerning the Edinburgh University Press Speculative Realism Series from several weeks ago HERE has indicated (a post which netted around 750+ views as expected), it appears that the problems concerning a lack of objectivity and professionalism extend far and beyond what many might even realize. My experience was not with Edinburgh but rather Open Humanities Press (a different series within Open Humanities mind you, as I published with OHP anyway but decided to work with another editor who I found to be eminently more professional and actually, you know, fair in their decision-making). However, as I stated in that post, the editor whom I initially was going to contact at OHP wouldn't even agree to receive a manuscript proposal simply because I was the person who wrote it! This without really even knowing me personally, without ever even having spoken to me. So if that's not review by peers rather than formal peer-review I don't know what is. Fantastic to believe, I know. But it is true. Yes, this particular OHP editor refused to read a book proposal before it was ever sent to them, before this person even knew what it was about, before they ever even knew a title, a length, a subject, etc.  Based strictly on my name and the fact they did not like me for whatever reason, and nothing else. Not the level of my scholarship, not my talent, not the quality of my work - but upon what amounted to gossip and hearsay, second-rate information that they "heard" and formed an opinion of me which had no basis in reality and turned out to be false anyway. So, obviously that's a huge problem if that editor, whose job it is to be a consummate professional and behave as much, especially if someone is made editor of a series that has even an iota of pretense to be willing to look at submissions from anyone (even critical submissions - yeah right), or any pretense at all to having a fair or objective review process that would give them or their series credibility. That's what is lost with so-called review by peers. (Needless to say, many years later as this person went on to become the editor for other book series/journals one has to question: how can their judgment be trusted now? Afterall, clearly decisions weren't being made in virtue of the quality of work but rather someone's identity alone. What reason would one to think that that has changed? Further, what does this say about the work that they have agreed to edit? Was it because of that work's quality rather than political ties? We'll never know.)

To sum, Brian Leiter recently has written about such nonsense HERE. His post references an open access journal that explicitly claims it does not tow party lines or push specific political agendas, however that is the sort of wait-and-see claim which I suspect will result in disappointment, much like the case of the Edinburgh University Press Speculative Realism series has or PhilPapers and its editorialship has (again, the Speculative Realism series at PhilPapers has had its fair share of specific authors' work going missing or just never even being acknowledged as a submission, supposedly due to "technical errors" - how convenient! And to think, a book whose title is Speculative Realism: An Epitome is nowhere to be found in PhilPapers given that "Speculative Realism" is a category and the book has that same title. Now that omission is really convenient, wouldn't you say?).

But, you get the idea. My point here isn't that I have some axe to grind or am upset that my own work has been subjected to such silliness. Given that I would end up publishing the book anyway and that it has since been acknowledged and reviewed (quite positively in many cases) by those in that particular area of study, as well as is said to be one of the more objective (as is possible) commentaries on the topic, which is a rarity, I wouldn't be complaining about my situation personally or about any one editor, series, or person individually. My point simply is to address how dangerous and fallible a "review by peers" process can be and that more often than not its intention of providing expediency while at the same time maintaining fairness is more or less, a pipe dream. I have gone at lengths to support this claim with my own experience regarding the situation, that's all. But it is a situation which is much too common.

There is much, way too much, peer review that isn't much more than cronyism, and it needs to stop. One needn't look much further than speculative realism and its world of publishing as a good case in point. But obviously given the fallible nature of the process itself, given human nature, it occurs most times where formal peer review isn't taking place. And that is something which I believe needs to change.


Thursday, December 7, 2017

End of the World As We Know It: What's the Draw of Dystopian Sci-Fi? (article)

LiveScience online magazine with a very nice article HERE. What stood out to me in particular was how science fiction enables one to speculatively imagine a future which isn't as bright as many suppose technological science would deliver us unto. The best of science fiction, I think at least, allows one to feel as if the future in question is right around the corner, even if five minutes away.

Science fiction inevitably is a speculative-imaginative philosophical enterprise allowing human beings to not only consider what French philosopher Quentin Meillassoux has titled "the great outdoors," but to partake in a radical form of deanthropocentric and bleak ecological transcendence by imagining what twentieth century process philosopher Alfred North Whitehead referred to as other cosmic epochs being possible, including futures without the human.

For some H.P. Lovecraft accomplishes this with his use of the horror genre and correspondingly his "cosmic pessimism." I, however, do not find Lovecraft so potent. I find that science fiction, not horror, is the truly more philosophical literature of the two.

Tuesday, December 5, 2017

The Quantum of Explanation: Whitehead's Radical Empiricism (NDPR review)

This is refreshing considering the amount of questionable Whitehead scholarship published as of late. Auxier teaches process philosophy at Southern Illinois University Carbondale and is a trusted source on the topic.

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The Quantum of Explanation: Whitehead's Radical Empiricism
// Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews // News

2017.12.03 : View this Review Online

Randall E. Auxier and Gary L. Herstein, The Quantum of Explanation: Whitehead's Radical Empiricism, Routledge, 2017, 370pp., $150.00 (hbk), ISBN 9781138700161.
Reviewed by George Lucas, U.S. Naval Academy

This is an insightful and provocative account of Whitehead's metaphysics by two gifted and determined scholars. It centers on the claim that the key concept in that metaphysical system, the "actual entity" or "actual occasion" (res vera), is an explanatory, illustrative, or heuristic concept (as the so-called "Bohr atom" serves in physics, for example), and decidedly neither a "Ding-an-sich" nor a descriptive account of what "actuality" is actually composed of.

Instead, the authors identify Whitehead's technically challenging metaphysics as his effort to understand "the quantum of explanation" rather than to disclose some fundamental quantum of Being itself. 

Monday, December 4, 2017

Nietzsche as Social Critic: “Twilight of the Idols” (Part One) (Partially Examined Life podcast)

Partially Examined Life podcast put out another rather interesting episode on Nietzsche. I believe there are at least two other Nietzsche episodes in their several years-long history, each worth listening to. 

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Episode 178: Nietzsche as Social Critic: "Twilight of the Idols" (Part One)
// The Partially Examined Life Philosophy Podcast

Friedrich Niezsche
On Friedrich Nieztsche's 1888 book summarizing his thought and critiquing the founding myths of his society. He defends "spiritualized" instinct and frenzied creativity, but also Napoleon and war. We try to figure out what kind of social critic he'd be today. Would we actually like him?
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Sunday, December 3, 2017

J.G. Ballard's contribution to post-punk and new wave

"Punk" aesthetics has had its share of predecessors, but just as important is punk aesthetics' impact upon, and subsequent genre development of, "punk rock" as musical genre (what "punk" is usually most associated with). The close association between cultural phenomenon and musical genre places punk near other counter-culture movements, whether the motorcycle and hot-rod gangs of the 1940's and 1950's listening to doo-wop (i.e. the "rockers" and the "greasers"), the beat generation in America with its jazz, the sun children and "hippies" of the '60s and folk rock, and folk rock becoming the psychedelic (and loud) garage bands that transformed into "heavy metal" during the late '70s and early '80s. Even "alternative" music - made popular among young people due to college radio airplay during the early '90s - was an "alternative" to the main stream and has influenced what today is called "indie music."  In current times as genres are unnecessarily multiplied I find consolation that the do-it-yourself, edgy and aggressive, throw-the-system culture of punk rock has transformed for the better and evolved the way it has while retaining its core aesthetic elements. During the years of (roughly) 1977 through 1983 or '84 punk transformed into something that so many young people today are trying to re-create. Namely, punk became post-punk and new wave. As that transformation took place however, none of punk's edginess or aggressive aesthetic was lost. How did such a transformation occur, and what might we learn from it?

"Post punk," the natural outgrowth of punk that picked up where other alternative and edgy anti-social genres took off (not only music but youth culture more generally), had the identity it did because of a brand new musical invention: the synthesizer.  While the electric guitar took rock 'n roll to an entirely new level in garage bands and then metal, the synth took punk into post-punk and new wave - elevating and developing the original punk aesthetic into something even more dark, edgy, and untimely. Unlike today when counter-cultural genres meet popular or new technologies and dilute as a result, post-punk and new wave retained its distinct "dark" and post-apocalyptic vibe nevertheless. With the invention of the synthesizer and its eventual low cost price point, and the fact that quite simply just more people were incorporating synthesizer into that genre of music, one would expect post-punk to be a former shell of punk rock, especially when it came to its dark and edgy aesthetic and its "underground" and "independent" nature of composition. So how did post-punk and new wave do it? How did they retain that core "punk" aesthetic element? Well, as I found out in the fantastic documentary which I embed below, musicians during those years weren't just playing the synthesizer. They were all reading plenty of J.G. Ballard. Allow me to explain...

Punk rock's transformation into post-punk and new wave just wasn't a matter of brand new musical instrument and whose hands happened to be on it; it was, rather, a matter of there being twin core aesthetic influences affecting and even driving that transformation. Therefore, the transformation of punk into post-punk and new wave was due just as much to new literary/film/cultural genre (including "cyber punk," dystopian or post-apocalyptic science fiction - again, whether literature or film ) as it was to new musical instrument. The relatively new genre of post-apocalyptic sci-fi, of dark futurism, of cosmic pessimism, helped post-punk and new wave keep in view what punk rock could have easily lost: speculating a darker and and more "bleak" future to come. And, that future? It wasn't to be seen five hundred years from then, nor even a hundred. It could very well be five minutes from then. The apocalyptic future was immanent. Ballard, but also Kubrick, and others like them, created speculative futures which could very well be seen as occurring the day after tomorrow for those who encountered them. They were futures which were all the more probable, and this made them all the more terrifying. For as fictional as they were, these were realist speculative futures.

Definitely worth watching, Synth Britannia charts the course of post-punk and new wave circa 1977 through 1984. (For those unable to watch, THIS write-up in the Observer would be almost just as good.) And as we see, J.G. Ballard, Kubrick's 1971 masterpiece Clockwork Orange, and other dark, edgy, and bleak iconic aesthetic cultural treasures had their share fair of influence on the genre of music that, to my mind, represents Generation-X's sensibilities more than any other. Interestingly, if I might add, Gen-X philosophers still read Ballard today (and many, including me, still listen to post-punk and new wave, whether the originals or the "new retro-wave" of today).

My understanding is that the electronics of new wave that transformed into experimental dance music and electronic avante-garde are what influenced CCRU and friends such as Nick Land and Sadie Plant. Philosophers such as Ray Brassier have written about Ballard (and also participated in improvisational music scenarios), and perhaps even more generally speaking, many Gen-X philosophers are tremendously influenced by "cyber punk," post-punk and new wave's corresponding literary genre.

Ballard makes appearances mostly in the first half of the documentary.

Saturday, December 2, 2017

another dissertation: John Maus (yes...John Maus the musician)

HERE. His dissertation, a political treatise in the Continental philosophical vein, is worth looking at, especially if one is a fan of Maus's music. (Check out his music and philosophy HERE.) Vulture Magazine also has a nice write up on Maus's whereabouts and activities HERE.

Maus is a very rare instance of a professional, or highly "successful" let's say, musician who is also a professional (Ph.D.'d) academic philosopher. I think he essentially maintains equal notoriety in both fields.

Maus had been producing music in the 2010's and then went on to focus upon completing his Ph.D. at the University of Hawaii. The dissertation's completion is fairly recent, or recent enough that the fact he has also just released a new album is an amazing feat in itself. I should also congratulate Maus for recently getting married. His wife is a rather famous artist from Hungary and a great human being as well.

New John Maus album Screen Memories is available now.

Dissertation on Post-Kantian process philosophy and Schelling and Whitehead

By Mathew David Segall, HERE. I've know Matt for quite a few years now having been a regular reader of his blog Footnotes to Plato.  My understanding is that he completed the Ph.D. fairly recently and is now teaching out in California somewhere. In any case, Matt has always been supportive of After Nature blog and supportive in our mutual philosophical interests. He is a first rate human being to say the least. During the height of the blog wars ("skirmishes") which took place in the early 2010's  over the meaning of "Speculative Realism" and the validity and worth (or lack thereof) of "object oriented ontology" for example, Matt always responded as a class act to those who, frankly, behaved like disrespectful monsters and thugs. There were several occasions where I saw other bloggers level the most personal and horrible insults at him and he responded with such dignity and class.  That always impressed me so much. When I was personally attacked by these same people Matt was kind and supportive, was never judgmental, and always took the time to listen knowing that there are two sides to every story.  I am so grateful to him for that. 

I've learned alot from interacting with Matt and certainly have learned much from his absolutely fantastic dissertation which you should certainly take a look at if you get the chance. It's excellent work.

Friday, December 1, 2017

A Speculative Phenomenology of Non-human Consciousness (Why Crabs and Lobsters Deserve Protection from Being Cooked Alive)

William James' "On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings" remains an untimely text in its call for human beings to relinquish the anthropocentric standpoint of phenomenology and adopt, rather, a speculative phenomenological approach of non-human forms of consciousness. Thus not only was James ahead of his time, he is, today, ahead of ours. 

If ontology, the science of being, catalogs the "furniture of the universe," as it were, all too often I am asked why we should not consider "objects" per se in an attempt to engage the science of being in its most universal sense. I typically respond that we must examine what is at stake exactly, and that even from a deanthropocentric point of view, ecologically but also methodologically human beings are forced into a position of "transcendence," where transcendence means first and foremost stepping outside of the human - this so that we might accomplish a thoroughgoing, substantial, but most of all accurate picture as to what is and in what way it is. In other words, so that we might achieve not only a speculative phenomenology, but a speculative naturalism.

Phenomenology, as I have incessantly argued over the years, need not be the strictly Husserlian observor-dependent, descriptive-reportage affair we are told that it is (here I am thinking about Tom Sparrow The End of Phenomenology: Metaphysics and the New Realism and its self-refuting thesis regarding the "non-existence" or death of phenomenology and the supposed existence and healthy life of philosophy's Loch Ness monster, Speculative Realism). Indeed, others, whether Alfred North Whitehead or Charles Hartshorne, or C.S. Peirce (incidentally phenomenology was actually a branch of mathematics for Peirce, i.e. category theory), are thinkers unlike Husserl in that their phenomenology is necessarily a speculative non-human, or better, trans-conscious enterprise whose transcendental engagements are logical-mathematical.  Phenomenology understood as mathematical-ontology.

For as abstract as this sounds, we know that in Peirce or Whitehead or Hartshorne value is independent of human valuers. We know that consciousness is a qualitative affair, yet quality need not be limited to consciousness (in fact, in Peirce it isn't - c.f. "Firstness"). What this means, then, is that the stakes of ontology are perhaps even higher than supposed. While consciousness is not a central principle or the category of "life" vitalistically made ultimate in terms of what is  fundamental to this speculative phenomenological enterprise, this is not to say that consciousness or life is not entirely unconducive to the sorts of generic descriptions that make for ontology as a science of being. On the other hand, we should not be considering "objects" or what is like to be the inside of a watermelon or doorknob when forms of consciousness other than our own are being abused, are suffering, are forced into extinction. Categorial logical-mathematical description and operation, when knitted with an axiological perspective that is at once realist and speculative enough to secure metaphysical transcendence, is enough to anchor an ethics wide enough to accommodate the living and non-living alike. Thus it is not just about description but activity and function.

From a post of mine some time back, then a link to an Aeon article with a very, very interesting excerpt which, to me, leads me to continue to think that pain can be said to be the sovereign common denominator. Quoting myself, I wrote:
In the tradition of Jakob von Uexkull or even to some degree William James and Alfred North Whitehead, it isn't about multiplying different world pictures nor even rendering them common to ours, even though the diversity of world pictures has its place.  I think it is about speculatively and phenomenologically allowing non-human worlds to exhibitively self-display their experiential features where these features are attended to for what they are.    Ordinal phenomenology is one method, speculative naturalism another; there is also semiotic phenomenology or more broadly bio and ecosemiotics.  For several years now I've commented on how it isn't anthropocentric/anthropormorphic at all to find that pain, for example, is part of a constituting domain which is extra-human (or non-human).  It's one thing to read a human face across nature by imposing human emotive qualities upon other things within the world, but another to realize the broader intensive aesthetic character of the natural world of which human beings are but a small part.  Equally alien (distinct with our own modes of perception, as are all organisms) we are nevertheless deeply natural - deeply "part" of nature.   
I realize the trend is to de-humanize nature as much as possible, but really, human beings are part and parcel of nature, and so we can expect that what we experience is continuous from the outside in rather than assuming it is always the case we project our experience (onto others) from the inside out...
Even removing human beings from nature and stating, "Ok, the experience of others may not be like our subjective experience" doesn't mean that others aren't capable of experiencing emotion, pain, etc. etc.  The fact is, it isn't our experience to begin with.  If human beings didn't exist, elephants would still grieve the loss of a matriarch, dolphins would still express joy,crabs would still feel pain, and so on.  Further still, all things - taking a panexperiential viewpoint - would struggle to persist and would undergo self-relations.  We don't need to appeal to analogies involving human-centered experience to make that case.  No one is saying the world is like us.  I (for one) am simply saying that we are part of the world, naturally, like everything else.  If that is true then there is continuity as much as there is difference.  Neither is absolute in reality although it is possible to take either epistemologically true and absolute. 
Schopenhauer stated that empathy, given the reality of suffering. could be a basis for ethics; and no one wants to suffer afterall, Yet it seems that the conclusion ontologically precedes what things are.  Which is to say, yes, all things do suffer in their basic and most essential persistence, ontologically. The ethical judgment regarding that ontological fact is a "second," as Peirce would say.  Not a "first."
Aeon has a nice article up HERE. I've touched on the subject HERE and HERE. From the Aeon article I found the following particularly interesting:
In another experiment, Elwood and colleagues found that shore crabs rapidly learn to avoid locations they associate with harmful experiences. The crabs were offered a choice of two dark shelters: in one, they received shocks; in the other, they did not. In general, crabs prefer to return to shelters that they have previously occupied. But after repeatedly receiving a shock in one of the shelters, the crabs were much less likely to return to it – a phenomenon known as conditioned place avoidance. 
Motivational trade-offs and conditioned place avoidance are what I call credible indicators of pain – credible because they cannot be explained away as mere reflexes, and because they tie in with a reasonable theory about the function of pain for animals that feel it. The idea in the background here is that pain is a guide to decision-making. To make flexible decisions, animals need to be able to weigh the seriousness of an injury against other things they need. Sometimes fleeing is the right thing to do; sometimes carrying on as normal is the right thing to do; sometimes tending the injury is the right thing to do – it depends on the situation. Pain is the currency in which the need to stop, or the need to flee, is measured. When we find an animal making flexible decisions by integrating information about past or present injury with information about its other needs, that is a credible indicator of pain.